Full article is below, and linked. Below are excerpts quoted then followed by my responses.
Amit Segal wrote:
“But Hamas, buoyed by the “starvation” campaign gaining traction worldwide, refused.”
Yes, that seems true. That starvation campaign was based on lies which the West gobbled up as true: Photos of children with preexisting conditions were used, even if they were posed together with overweight parents. As @imshin noted on X/Twitter, the cafes and restaurants in Gaza were opening at a quick pace and Gazans were happy to brag about these on TikTok.
“The combination of Hamas’s obstinance and Trump’s overconfidence pushed Israel to decide on entering Gaza City.”
Interesting. Makes sense to me.
“…but not one of them [Israel’s Security Cabinet] believed Israel had any binding commitment to the Qataris not to target Hamas operatives on their soil.
“Netanyahu called President Trump minutes beforehand.”
Fantastic. Just like others have said and written, it’s impossible for Israel to attack Doha without permission first from the USA. To make things appear “proper,” obviously afterward the USA as to “blame Israel” and say “naughty, naughty” and “don’t ever do that again” as the USA publicly pretends to not know anything about it. But that’s just for show and it’s needed because Qatar is a strategic US ally with the USA’s largest military base anywhere in the middle east.
“The president, groggy after a long night of discussions, took time to answer. The strike went ahead.
“To this day, it’s unclear how Hamas’s senior figures escaped, but one thing is clear: the failed strike accelerated the deal.”
Yes. Perhaps the USA backdoor sent a warning to Qatar. Doesn’t matter, really. The deal was accelerated. Even if Israel “let some get away” it would serve a purpose to leave some alive so there’s someone left to come and negotiate and sign the new deal.
“Dermer sees it differently: he, too, links the strike to the agreement, but in a completely different way.”
OK, I’m listening…
“…the real achievement was bringing them into a plan that excluded the Palestinian Authority, at least for now. That’s what had delayed the Emiratis’ participation a year and a half earlier.”
See there? It’s the Arab states that extended the war. It’s not purely Netanyahu, whatever his personal hidden motives.
“The plan envisions that as long as Hamas refuses to disarm, reconstruction will proceed — but only in the half of the Strip under Israeli control. What two years of war couldn’t achieve, market forces will: people will choose where they prefer to live — among ruins under Hamas boots, or in a rebuilt zone with an Emirati-funded school and a caravan home for every family.”
Sounds brilliant. I didn’t know this was actually the plan. Leave it to Trump to come up with a market & business solution to create incentives on the ground. Of course, long-term, nothing will ever work and the Islamic Jihadists will always fight.
“A little faith,” said the Jews with the U.S. flag on their lapels — to the Jews wearing the Israeli one.”
The irony here is well-stated.
Excellent article. Thanks Tom for calling it to my attention!
Amit Segal’s article:
Excellent article By Amit Segal on Israel Hayom:
Land of Possibilities
If Israelis had heard how the President of the United States spoke about the hostages, it’s doubtful he would have received the roaring applause that echoed from one end of Hostages’ Square to the other last Saturday night. To say they were a secondary concern for him would be an understatement — and even that is an understatement.
Trump’s priority was eliminating Hamas — the American way. The twenty living hostages (he always confused their number and tended to minimize it — one wonders what Freud would say) seemed to him a marginal issue, collateral damage. Only later did he grasp how strategically important the matter was for Israelis — and therefore, for their government as well. In the U.S., presidents are usually criticized not for meeting too few hostage families, but for meeting them too often. (For reference, see “Ronald Reagan” on Google.)
In one of the discussions ahead of Gideon’s Chariots 2, Netanyahu spoke about the scar that would remain in Israeli society if our forces took Gaza at the cost of the hostages’ lives. It’s fair to assume he didn’t truly believe that moment would come. In recent months, Netanyahu and Dermer believed that an operation to capture Gaza City — if it ever began — would likely not reach its conclusion. As written here earlier, “something is cooking,” followed a week later by: “not necessarily a deal or an occupation — signs point to a third path” (“and now for something completely different”).
The Making of the “Stew”
Last spring, after the successful end of the war with Iran, Israel sought to use that momentum to reach a partial deal. The idea was to release half of the hostages and, during a 60-day ceasefire, reach roughly the same terms achieved this week. But Hamas, buoyed by the “starvation” campaign gaining traction worldwide, refused.
President Trump, still basking in the glow of his victory over Iran, assumed the IDF could eliminate what remained of Hamas as swiftly as it had crushed Tehran’s nuclear program. The combination of Hamas’s obstinance and Trump’s overconfidence pushed Israel to decide on entering Gaza City.
The idea came from Minister Avi Dichter: “Conquering the city means the end of Hamas,” he said in one meeting. And then, almost miraculously, things shifted. “Even before our forces entered the city,” Dermer recalled, “three days of talk about the operation accomplished what three months of negotiations had failed to do. Hamas suddenly agreed to a partial deal. But by then, it was too late.”
Israel faced two options: either conquer what remained of the Strip and establish a U.S.-backed military government — which, Dermer and Netanyahu believed, would require national unity and explicit support from Trump. The first was lacking, and the second was uncertain. The other path was a plan conceived in Israel, led by the Americans, and supported by Arab states.
The American Touch
President Reagan once told his staff: “You write the plans, I’ll be the one to sell them.” So it was here, with Dermer as the chief architect. It was clear that any plan publicly branded as “Israeli” would die before birth. That doesn’t mean every tweet was coordinated, as the minister clarified at this week’s cabinet meeting, but on the major issues — they worked hand in hand.
Negotiations with Middle Eastern countries were long and grueling. During a round held in New York, it seemed impossible to fit all those elephants into one room. Israeli representatives returned with 17 substantial comments from the Sunni states — and even a glimmer of agreement on the horizon.
September 9: The Turning Point
On the morning of September 9, a brief three-way consultation took place: Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Katz, and Minister Dermer. All three supported the planned strike in Doha. Many issues came up — but not one of them believed Israel had any binding commitment to the Qataris not to target Hamas operatives on their soil.
Netanyahu called President Trump minutes beforehand.
The president, groggy after a long night of discussions, took time to answer. The strike went ahead.
To this day, it’s unclear how Hamas’s senior figures escaped, but one thing is clear: the failed strike accelerated the deal. In recent weeks, I wrote that it was “the most successful failed assassination” — in the sense that it signaled to the Qataris that the war would reach them if they continued their double game. Dermer sees it differently: he, too, links the strike to the agreement, but in a completely different way.
Qatar — The Spoiler State
The Qataris, it turns out, believed that by agreeing to host negotiations, they had gained immunity from Israeli attacks on their territory. From their perspective, the strike was a flagrant violation — and a deep insult. Qatar had long failed to broker any deal, but when it came to ruining others, it excelled. “The spoiler state,” officials in Jerusalem called it — capable of torpedoing any agreement, as it had done to Egypt’s hostage deal the previous spring.
Qatar is a complicated country, Netanyahu recently said. And indeed it is. In Jerusalem, they describe it as two trains running behind the same locomotive: one led by the ruler’s mother and brother — staunch Muslim Brotherhood supporters and fierce Israel-haters; the other led by the prime minister and several senior officials who seek closer ties with the West.
Around April, a shift was detected in Doha. Relations with Washington deepened significantly, and Hamas — once the pampered protégé — became a burden and a stain. Arab states hurried to attend the emir’s conference, partly out of anger toward Israel, partly out of fear of an Israeli-dominated Middle East. The Americans’ brilliance was in channeling that negative energy into fuel to push the deal forward.
“You want Israel to stop?” they told the Sunni states. “Then help us end the war.” Thus, they forged a seemingly impossible framework: a pan-Arab, almost pan-Muslim commitment to dismantle Hamas. Dermer drafted Israel’s apology for the death of a Qatari security officer, and Doha responded with a goodwill gesture — dramatically softening Al-Jazeera’s hostile tone.
A New Framework — Without the PA
More than rallying Arab states against Hamas — which had worn out the patience of the entire Arab world — the real achievement was bringing them into a plan that excluded the Palestinian Authority, at least for now. That’s what had delayed the Emiratis’ participation a year and a half earlier.
In a way, that was the breakthrough: before this plan, Gaza was under the Palestinian Authority. Now, it is under a joint Arab-international framework — until further notice. The PA hates Hamas so deeply that it simply said yes.
The “Two-State” Redefined
“Yes, there will be a two-state solution,” Dermer said this week. “But not between the Jordan River and the sea — rather, inside the Gaza Strip itself.”
The plan envisions that as long as Hamas refuses to disarm, reconstruction will proceed — but only in the half of the Strip under Israeli control. What two years of war couldn’t achieve, market forces will: people will choose where they prefer to live — among ruins under Hamas boots, or in a rebuilt zone with an Emirati-funded school and a caravan home for every family.
The Americans see this as a temporary arrangement and are confident that Hamas will soon disarm. Israel, of course, is far more skeptical.
“Explain this to me,” said IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir during one call. “Your multinational force — a few companies strong — reaches a tunnel. Hamas fighters are armed inside. How exactly does that end? Who hands over the weapons? And what if they don’t?”
“You didn’t believe the first phase would happen,” the Americans replied. “Have faith that the second will too.”
“A little faith,” said the Jews with the U.S. flag on their lapels — to the Jews wearing the Israeli one.
Source: Complete article: https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/10/16/until-victory/ Amit Segal's excerpt:Behind Closed Doors: How the Deal With Hamas Was Born
